Introspection, or looking inward to observe one's experience, is inherent in many methods used to study feelings, the experiential component of emotion. Challenges of introspection make faithful, high-fidelity descriptions of feelings difficult to attain. A method that (1) cleaves to a specific moment, (2) cleaves to pristine inner experience, (3) brackets presuppositions, and (4) utilizes an iterative process may be particularly well suited to this task. We review some contemporary introspective methods from the perspective of these four methodological constraints, finding (...) that Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) addresses the constraints most fully. We present DES findings on feelings to highlight the unique contributions careful introspective methods make to emotion science. High-fidelity descriptions of feelings are necessary for a complete understanding of emotion. (shrink)

After using descriptive experience sampling to study randomly selected moments of inner experience, we make observations about feelings, including blended and multiple feelings. We observe that inner experience usually does not contain feelings. Sometimes, however, feelings are directly present. When feelings are present, most commonly they are unitary. Sometimes people experience separate emotions as a single experience, which we call a blended feeling. Occasionally people have multiple distinct feelings present simultaneously. These distinct multiple feelings can be of opposite valence, with (...) one pleasant and the other unpleasant. We provide examples that inform theories of emotions and discuss the important role observational methodology plays in the effort to understand inner experience including feelings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Side Stepping The Issues: Disappointment With An Ethics Consult For A Medically High Risk PatientBrent R. CarrMonths of severe symptoms were a blur—hour after hour of suffering. Sleep is her only respite. Her 5-word diagnosis, “treatment-refractory depression with anxious distress,” seemed too orderly, like a flattened 2-dimensional strip of ribbon that simply ironed out all the chaos and confused distress roiling within her. Anyone entering the psychiatric unit early (...) in the morning could hear her near-breathless sobbing, calling for nursing help, repeatedly pleading to anyone who would listen that she was dying. By afternoon, her wheelchair would be situated off to one side of the milieu to prevent agitation of other [End Page 13] patients. From there, she would summon them with small gestures or brief, incessant outbursts to save her, that her body was decaying, withering before them. Such is the torment of nihilistic delusions. She flailed her arms, rocking back and forth, lamenting that no one would help. Although she possessed full leg strength, she refused to stand from the wheelchair, fearing collapse. These distressed pleas were sustained well past each dinner, the anguish echoing from her room, and during her evening shower. Sometimes a pillow-muffled sigh and silence would disclose when her torments became engulfed in sleep.Two years prior, she had a similar episode that lasted almost 3-years. It had failed to respond to months of psychotherapy and more than 15 medication trials. That time, she had cried with happiness after the mental illness went into full remission after only a three-week course of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). She described this as her miracle. But as miraculous as the ECT was for her, it was problematic. She is a high-risk patient with ongoing hypertension and Wolff-Parkinson-White Syndrome, a condition that leads to an inappropriately fast pulse from aberrant electrical pathways in the heart. During the final week of ECT, she experienced a marked blood pressure surge that led to severe cardiac pathology—Takatsubo’s cardiomyopathy. This is also known as “stress cardiomyopathy” or “broken heart syndrome,” befitting the vexed emotional state she had been in. The cardiomyopathy resembled a myocardial infarct, and it took several months for her to fully recover. Unfortunately, this prevented the use of ECT as a relapse prevention treatment. By one-year post-ECT, her systolic left ventricular dysfunction had resolved, and her ejection fraction (the heart’s pumping efficiency) had normalized.Now, once again, she was treatment-resistant, and ECT was the treatment of choice. The risk stratification for ECT encompassed her prior Takatsubo’s cardiomyopathy, which has a small but known chance for recurrence. This made her a high-risk patient. This risk was convoluted even more by her depression-induced psychosis, wherein she believed that she was dying, that meds were poisoning her, and that ECT would kill her from a heart attack. Before the psychiatric team consulted the ECT service, a mental health court had already ruled regarding her lack of capacity for her medical decisions. The court had authorized her husband as her proxy with authority to consent for her medical care, including for ECT. My role in this case was as the ECT proceduralist from the neuromodulation service who had been consulted by the primary team. The husband was an informed individual and signed consent for ECT. These events all coincided with the primary attending’s departure on scheduled leave. There was now a new covering attending.The resident psychiatrist was apprehensive about ECT and deliberated that the patient was at least able to identify potential risks of ECT—even if exacerbated by a nihilistic delusion. The resident speculated that perhaps the patient should at least be able to refuse ECT, given her previous cardiomyopathy. The newly arrived attending deferred a response regarding her concern and stated it had already been decided by the “team.” This amplified doubt. The medical students sensed the resident’s apprehension and felt confused about whether the patient should receive ECT or not. This dynamic quickly spilled over into nursing discussions, where some were now hesitating about the decision. The cohesiveness of the psychiatry treatment team was compromised... (shrink)

Actions that financially benefit one person may present risk to another person. For example, the payment incentives of portfolio managers and investors are often asymmetrical such that actions that benefit a portfolio manager can pose financial risk to clients. Despite the presence and potential harm of these asymmetries, few have addressed the question of who exploits these asymmetries and how to mitigate potential harm. Our study examined the effect of selfish personality traits (the Dark Triad) and interpersonal bonding on decision-making (...) for the self, another person, and another person with under reward asymmetry present. Results demonstrated that individuals higher in narcissism and psychopathy made risky decisions for themselves. However, when reward asymmetries were present, all three Dark Triad traits were associated with making riskier decisions for another person in order to benefit the self. There was also a significant interaction between interpersonal closeness generated through bonding and psychopathy such that bonding made the decision-making processes of those high in psychopathy less risky for others. These findings have implications for how different individuals with different relationships make self and other-based financial decisions, and how those decisions change when rewards are asymmetrical. (shrink)

Drosophila neural progenitor cells, or neuroblasts, alter their transcriptional profile over time to produce different neural cell types. A recent paper by Pearson and Doe shows that older neuroblasts can be reprogrammed to behave like young neuroblasts, and to produce early neural cell types, simply by expressing the transcription factor, Hunchback.1 The authors show that competence to respond to Hunchback diminishes over time. Mani pulating neural progenitors in this way may have important implications for therapeutic uses of neural stem cells. (...) BioEssays 26:711–714, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In the contemporary literature of educational philosophy and theory, it is almost routinely assumed or claimed that 'education' is a 'contested' concept: that is, it is held that education is invested – as it were, 'all the way down' - with socially constructed interests and values that are liable to diverge in different contexts to the point of mutual opposition. It is also often alleged that post-war analytical philosophers of education such as R. S. Peters failed to appreciate such contestability (...) in seeking a single unified account of the concept of education. Following a brief re-visitation of Peters' analytical influences and approach and some consideration of recent 'post-analytical' criticisms of analytical educational philosophy on precisely this score, it is argued that much of the case for the so-called 'contestability' of education rests on a confusion of different concepts with different senses of 'education' that proper observance of well-tried methods of conceptual analysis easily enables us to avoid. (shrink)

Abstract:Writing a little over a decade ago of developments in educational philosophy, R. F. Dearden remarked on the dearth of alternative approaches to that of conceptual analysis which predominated, at least in Anglophone cultures, at that time. One possible avenue of enquiry which he identified as conspicuously absent in this respect was the development of a distinctively Catholic approach to problems of educational philosophy, observing that a work of the mid‐war years, Maritain's Education at the Crossroads (1943), appeared to be (...) well nigh the only modem effort in this direction. More than a decade on from this, in a climate no longer exclusively dominated by conceptual analysis – indeed, in which there is unprecedented interest in a wealth of different schools, traditions and approaches to philosophy of education – Dearden's remarks about the absence of a distinctively Catholic perspective still apply. In the following essay, therefore, the authors have undertaken, via a critical analysis of Maritain's educational speculations of half a century ago, to try to discern some of the principal issues and considerations which would need to be addressed in the interests of identifying a distinctively Catholic educational philosophy. (shrink)